This paper proposes a security violation detection method for RBAC based interoperation to meet the requirements of secure interop-
With the rapid development of network technology and distributed applications, information interaction and cooperation between distributed systems have become increasingly frequent. In distributed environment, how to implement secure interoperation between independent systems is one of the key problems in distributed access control. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is the most popular access control model at present. Compared with traditional access control models, Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC), RBAC is a model with greater generality and flexibility, and can even express DAC and MAC strategies [1] . RBAC has been extensively applied in electronic businesses and large information systems.
To fulfill the requirements of distributed access control, extension of RBAC model has been further analyzed to solve problems of secure interoperation between systems in distributed environment [2] . Kapadia et al. proposed IRBAC, a model of access control for interoperation between distributed applications, to realize secure transdomain operation through role mapping [3] . Joshi et al, proposed XML Role-Based Access Control (XRBAC) to constitute mapping information between domains, and provided description of role mapping [4] . Role mapping mechanism associated distributed applications together, implemented access control for interoperation between them, and therefore established secure interoperation [5] . However, the process of introducing role mapping mechanism may also in-troduce new security violation and result in illegal interoperation, and interoperation security would be breached [6] . When low permission gets equivalence with high permission thru transitive relations, such as mapping and hierarchy relation, a typical security violation, Cyclic Inheritance Conflict, mainly occurring in RBAC based interoperation [7] . [8] further discussed methods to eliminate security violation based on IRBAC model, but neither [8] nor IRBAC proposed methods to detect security violation. [9] proposed to collect all role information of each distributed application, merge duplicate roles, decompose and refactor ambiguous roles, establish new role relations, and compute security violation based on this information. However, it is quite difficult to compute in real distributed environment with such a centralized method.
This paper formalizes definition of RBAC based secure interoperation in distributed environment, proposes an optimized method to detect security violation according to the features of distributed environment, further analyzed types of security violation, and provides more information to eliminate security violation.
The rest of this paper is organized as followings. Section 2 reviews the traditional RBAC model. Secure interoperation in RBAC is described in Sect. 3. Our minimum security violation detection algorithm is specified in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents the simulation experiment and result analysis of security violation detection. We further analyze the security violation with case study in Sect. 6.
Traditional RBAC Models
In RBAC, access privileges are granted to roles, rather than users. Users acquire access privilege through their role association. Since roles in the system are relatively more stable than users and have intuitive meanings, the work of system security administrators is greatly simplified and their workload is greatly reduced.
The Secure interoperations implemented through role mapping between several RBAC systems should also conform to the AS basic rules. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the role hierarchy is denoted by solid lines, and role mapping between different RBAC systems is denoted by dash lines. In Fig. 1 (1) mapping RM1 shows that users associated with role B in Domain 1 have the permission of role Y in Domain 2. Through comparison, we can find in Fig. 1 (1) that interoperations related with role mapping RM1 and RM2 are secure, while in Fig. 1 (2) the establishment of role mapping resulted in interoperations violating AS basic rules:
Through role mapping RM1 and RM2, in the RBAC system of Domain 2, the lower role Y has the permission of the higher role X, which is contradictory to the hierarchy of role X and Y.
Through role mapping RM1 and RM3, as well as the hierarchy between role X and Y, in RBAC system of Domain 1, a hierarchy is established between role B
and D, which does not exist in independent RBAC systems.
To meet the requirement of AS basic rules, we extended basic concepts of RBAC, and introduced the definition of secure interoperation based on RBAC. Although the global detection method is effective, there are many difficulties when applying the method to real distributed environment.
Definition of Secure Interoperation
In distributed environment, it is difficult to centralize all roles and hierarchies of all independent role system to compute a global security strategy.
The amount of roles in global security strategy will increase with the addition of independent role systems or roles, and the computational scale of global detection method enlarges when the amount of roles in global security strategy increases.
Therefore such method will bring large computational load for complex distributed environment.
In view of the problems of the global detection method, we improved its computational method and introduced the minimum detection method.
Minimum Detection Method
First, minimum global role system is defined here as a new concept:
In the minimum Since the computing processes of step 1 and 2 of both methods are the same, only time complexities of other steps are considered, which can be deduced from formula (1) and It can be found in formula (3) and (4) that detection time of security violation for interoperation is proportional to the cube of total amount of roles involved in computation. The less the amount of roles involved in role mapping is, the less the computing time of the minimum detection method is than the global detection method.
Simulation Experiment and Result Analysis of Security Violation Detection
We performed simulation experiments of both security violation detection methods on PC with Pentium 2.4GHz, 1G RAM and Windows XP. In simulated environment, the global role system has following parameters:
(1) n denotes the amount of independent role systems.
(2) m' denotes the amount of roles involved in interoperation.
(3) m0 denotes total amount of roles in all independent role system. (4) t denotes the computing time of security violation detection.
The experiment simulated the global detection method and the minimum detection method through adjustment of n, m' and m0, recorded time spent on detection, and analyzed data of the experiment. Table 1 Data of simulation experiment for the global detection method . Fig. 2 Mean of simulation experiment data of the global detection method.
Experiment Analysis of the Global Detection Method
(1) Set the amount of independent role systems n=10, and randomly set the amount of roles in each independent role system as well as role relations.
(2) Set the total amount m0 of roles in all independent role systems from 100 to 1000 with an increment of 100 each.
(3) Set the amount of roles involved in interoperation m'= 100, and randomly generate role mapping relations.
(4) Do the experiment for 10 times for each m0, and record computing time of the global detection method.
According to the setting of parameters above, following data could be collected through simulation experiment.
In Table 1 , the first row is the number of experiments, and the first column is the total amount of roles in all independent role system m0, other data are computing time. Compute the mean of computing time of each m0 from Table 1, and we get Fig. 2 . We can find that computing time of the global detection method is prolonged as the total amount m0 of roles in all independent role systems increases.
Experiment Analysis of the Minimum Detection Method
(1) Set the amount of independent role systems n=10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and randomly set the amount of roles in each independent role system as well as role relations.
(2) Set the total amount of roles in all independent role system m0=1000.
(3) Set the total amount m' of roles involved in interoperation from 100 to 1000 with an increment of 100 each, and randomly generate role mapping relations. (4) Do the experiment for 10 times for each n, m', record computing time of the minimum detection method, and compute the mean time.
In Table 2 , the first row is the amount of roles involved in interoperation m', the first column is the amount of independent role systems n, and other data are means of computing time. Following two conclusions can be drawn from experiment data in Table 2: (1) As illustrated in Fig. 3 , we can find from upward curves that for each n, time spent on computation is prolonged as m' increases, and the amount of roles involved in interoperation m' can be thought of as the main parameter affecting the computing time of the minimum detection method.
(2) As illustrated in Fig. 3 , we can find from the horizontal curves that for each m', time spent on computing is reduced as n increases. When m' is much less than m0, the effect is great; with the increase of m', the effect becomes less.
Analysis of Comparison Experiment of Both Methods
(2) Set the total amount of roles in all independent role systems m0=1000. (3) Set the total amount m' of roles involved in interoperation from 100 to 1000 with an increment of 100 each, and randomly generate role mapping relations. (4) Do the experiment for 10 times for each m', record the time of computation which is differently implemented Table 2 Data of simulation experiment for the minimum detection method.
Fig. 3
Mean of simulation experiment data of the global detection method. by the global detection method and the minimum detection method t and t' respectively.
The mean time spent on detecting security violation with the global detection method is 7585.5 units of CPU time, and the mean time spent on detecting security violation with the minimum detecting method for different m' is recorded in Table 3 . According to the first and the third column of Table 3 , mean time t' spent on detecting secu- Fig. 4 Comparison between theoretical value and computed value of time on computing security violation.
rity violation with the minimum detection method is prolonged as the amount of roles involved in role mapping m' increases. The second and the third column take the amount of roles in all independent role systems m0 and mean time spent on detecting security violation with global detection method t as reference standards, and recorded the proportional relations and t/t'. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , logarithmic curves of both proportional relations and t/t' almost coincides with each other, which shows that t' is proportional to (m')3. Therefore, when the amount of roles involved in role mapping m' is less than the amount of roles in the global role system mo, the performance of the minimum detection method is better than the global detection method.
Analysis of Security Violation
The detection method discussed above just find out if there is security violation in interoperations. Further analysis of matrixes in detecting course is also important to assist administrators to deal with security violation.
When analyzing security violation, we first have to understand the characteristic of security violation. According to basic principles of secure interoperation, there are generally two types of violation: On the basis of the minimum detection method, we can analyze the type of security violation with the algorithm above, and have the role mapping relation which causes security violation. To keep the autonomy of each independent role system, we should eliminate security violation, to the greatest extent through modification of role mapping. For non-associated violation, we only have to consider elimination of relations of roles, but for associated violation the relation of roles shall be modified with prudence so as to avoid lower roles accessing higher roles while not undermining legitimate relations.
Case Analysis
Now we take the interoperation in Fig. 1 (2) as an example to introduce method of security violation detection.
According to the minimum detection method, firstly 
Case Studies
To demonstrate the application of the role based secure interoperation and security violation detection method, we performed case studies with realistic scenarios in State Street Corporation (SSC). SSC is a global corporation providing IT financial services, whose IT development and support is also distributed in the whole world. Because the collaboration and communication is going to globalization, the security becomes more and more important in the interoperation among different regions.
Interoperation Environment
SSC IT staffs are playing many different roles in software development and support process. Table 4 is a brief list of the roles and responsibilities.
SSC global collaborative process covers multidomains, such as US team, China team and Europe team etc and each one has its own environment and applications Table 4 Parameters for security violation detection.
generally. Interoperation often happens across domains that each one maintains its own security settings such as user, role and permission etc to protect applications and information, thus there are many interoperations in the global collaborative development. Two typical situations are listed as following:
(1) Several domains share user identity information, such as employee id, name, division and office call etc in the same identity data source.
(2) There is no any intersection of user identity information across different domains.
Roles mapping is easier way to interoperate across multi-domains in above two situations. It can keep logical independency within domain while building links to the others. Role is also more flexible to map, because the amount of user or permission is huge in a global enterprise.
Building Interoperation
SSC senior managers identify human resources in different domain on the specific situation of each project. Generally, China team is responsible for most of DEV works and US team plays other roles in the whole project. The interopera-tion can be built as below:
Scenario One: At requirement analysis stage, China team requests use case from BA in US team. QA in US team requests delivery for functional testing at validation stage. RBAC based secure interoperation can be built simply as below, according to Definition 3. Domain 1 denotes the environment and applications in China, and domain 2 denotes those in US. Secure interoperation is defined as below:
The secure interoperation denotes that (1) Users in domain 1 assigned as the role DEV can have access permission of the role BA in domain 2.
(2) Users in domain 2 assigned with role QA can have access permission of role DEV in domain 1. Table 5 Parameters for security violation detection.
scenarios exampled above in most of development projects, BA, DEV and QA are often participated in interoperation to access codes and documents etc. Naturally, the roles BA, DTL, DEV and QA are involved in roles mapping. So the amount of roles in interoperation is 1 4. Table 5 shows the parameters for security violation detection according to above analysis. Actually, most of enterprise solutions don't maintain roles in distributed domains physically, but just logically. For example, an enterprise LDAP tree to keep all the roles and many branches to reflect configuration of applications. Above statistic comes from the enterprise LDAP tree in SSC.
As discussed in Sects. 4 and 5, we chose the critical value from parameter list in Table 5 and got such evaluation result on t/t':
Since the roles mapping is not applied arbitrarily in realistic scenarios, minimum method is more effective than global method to detect security violation in role based secure interoperation model.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed methods of security violation detection for RBAC based interoperation in distributed environment. Requirements of secure interoperation in distributed environment are analyzed in detail, and the definition of RBAC based secure interoperation are introduced and formalized on the basis of Core RBAC and Hierarchical
RBAC.
According to features of RBAC based interoperation in distributed environment, methods of security violation detection are discussed intensively.
Finally the case study in SSC global collaborative development process can prove that minimum security violation detection method has better performance than global one in realistic enterprise applications.
In future research, we intend to carry out our work in following aspects:
(1) Further improve the method of solving security violation, and provide users with best overall solution strategy, rather than simply compute the security of interoperation.
(2) In RBAC models more broadly, e.g. Constraint RBAC and Symmetric RBAC, define RBAC based secure interoperation and provide corresponding solutions to security violations.
(3) Design and implement the system architecture of interoperation between RBAC systems in integrated distributed environment.
